Some Accounting and Tax Aspects of LDC Debt Provisioning by Hogg, Mitchell
Mitchell Hogg
lOS R,,f/eiisi. 990. s nI 21 no 2. Instituts of Des clopinent Studies, Susses
64
Due to the rescheduling arrangements the bonds must
inherently have reduced value (reflecting the reduced
interest rate). This amount can be isolated by
comparing past and present yields. If this is regarded
as a 'realised' loss then, as above, this could be
reflected by writing off an appropriate amount of
bond, but I do not believe this presentation is
mandatory (i.e. the value reduction could be held as a
provision).
However, regardless of the presentation, the write-off
reflecting reduced interest income should not be taken
out of the provision for credit risk (i.e. the components
of the provision must be separately identified)
although credit risk can be assessed on the net value
after the write off for reduced yield.
Again, a trading intention would mean the bonds are
marked to market.
If the bond is to be held to redemption then, assuming
a write down is recognised to reflect the reduced yield
of the par bond, it is reasonable to recover that
discount on a yield to redemption (actuarial) basis.
However, the provision for credit risk must also be
reassessed and adjusted as necessary. If the yield
reduction was held by way of provision (as opposed to
actual write off) it may result in adjustments within the
provision, but no net effect overall.
Bonds held for trading would continue to be marked
to market without regard to yield implications.
Future Provisions
Future provisions against capital and uncollected
The information and figures in this article should he regarded as
accurate as of 31 January 1990. except in respect of the figures
contai ned in Ta hie I a id the corn meras a bout the Fi nance Bill 1990
schielt follow.
The Finance Bill 990 lays down clearer guidelines concerning tax
relief for [.DC debt provisions. These proposals allow banks to
cta im tax relief on provisions up lo val nec which approximate to t he
current Bank of England matrix levels. Future increases in
allowable provisions will he restricted to 5 per cent of the principal
sum per year from March 1991 onwards - i.e. tite limit for
December 1990 financial statements will be the same as December
l9g9. The same principle will apply to losses which are crystallised
by selling debt, un less it is sold hack lo tite debtor country when fu Il
relief for any loss will he given immediately.
Although the proposals are not necessarily as generous as banks
might have wished, they nevertheless do sel down some firm
guidelines and also ensti re t hat tite banks will get full tax relief even
if it (lises take s fexv years.
Accounting Treatment
A number of accounting issues arise concerning the
Mexico proposals in relation to the bonds that will be
issued to give effect to the Brady Plan.
Balance Sheet Presentation of Bonds
Although the bonds, if purchased in the secondary
market, could well be classified as 'investments', I
would favour maintaining them as 'advances'.
On a substance over form approach it is a rescheduled
loan.
Howver, if it is now intended to sell the bonds or
otherwise deal in them, then they should be treated as
'dealing investments'.
The fact that the bonds have a market price (in
Luxembourg) does not necessarily mean there is a
liquid market. Even if they are readily saleable, this
does not prevent them being recorded as 'advances'
provided there is an intention to hold to maturity.
After all, these days 'loans' can be sold.
Recorded Value of the Discount Bond
The discount bond will mature at only 65 per cent of
original value, therefore the bond should not be
recorded at a value above this.
It should be recorded at the 65 per cent of original
value, less any further provision needed to reflect
credit risk over the remaining life. The credit risk may
be considered to be negligible as the bonds are backed
by US Treasury Bonds.
Since the 35 per cent discount has been waived a loss
has been 'realised' (i.e. the full lOO per cent will neve.r
now be recovered) so this amount should be written
off against the provision leaving gross cost at 65 per
cent, less further provisions as deemed necessary.
Again, an intention to deal or trade the bonds would
suggest using a mark to market approach.
Recorded Value of the Par Bond
In the case of the par bond it could be argued that no
adjustments are needed and that the bonds continue to
be shown at gross cost less provisions for credit risk.
However, T believe a yield adjustment is also needed.
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recorded income will be needed in the usual manner
but, as indicated above, this is likely to be negligible
for the capital element and would also reflect any
guarantees of the interest element.
Technically the discount should be amortised even if
the market value of the bond is below cost where the
bond is to be held to maturity. However, if this is
indicative of problems with recoverability then it may
involve an equal increase in a provision for credit risk
(as discussed above). In practical terms, therefore, the
amortiation may not be recognised.
New Money
Any bank making new loans would have to make extra
provisions. At a minimum, these extra provisions
would have to accord with the Bank of England
matrix.
Policy Statement
Ideally the policy adopted should be fully disclosed,
i.e.:
whether bonds are disclosed net or gross;
whether immediate write off is made;
whether discount (on par bonds) is being amortised;
that further provisions are made where necessary.
International Provisioning
As shown in Table 1, the secondary market values of
most of the main LDC debt has continued to fall.
In response to this fall, the four major clearers in the
UK have made additional provisions against LDC
debt over the past year as follows:
These provisions are much higher than can be justified
under the new Bank of England matrix (published
January 1990). For example, using the matrix,
provisions against the major LDC borrowers at
31 December 1989 should be approximately 50 per
cent.
Different levels of provisions are applied
internationally.
For example, in Canada a matrix system sets
mandatory reserves at 40 to 45 per cent. In Switzerland
and Germany there are no formal rules but most
major banks have provided over 50 per cent. In Japan
the Ministry of Finance 'guidance' stipulates an
average maximum of 15 per cent against exposure to
39 problem countries. This is to be raised to 25 per cent
by 31 March 1990.
In the USA provisioning policy is very mixed, more
often than not relating to the strength of the individual
bank's balance sheet. Some banks have sold out of
LDC debt (First Interstate, Wells Fargo and Security
Pacific). Many sound regional banks have provisions
in excess of 50 per cent.
J. P. Morgan recently added $2 bn to its reserves for
credit losses for LDC debt, increasing provisions from
some 40 per cent to 100 per cent. Only trade related
short-term lending, which accounts for about 30 per
cent of J. P. Morgan's portfolio to LDCs, would not
be covered by the reserves.
Manufacturers Hanover Trust, Chase Manhattan and
Chemical Bank have raised their provisions against
LDC debt to some 36 per cent, 46 per cent and 65 per
cent respectively. Citicorp is now the only US money
centre bank which maintains its provisions below
30 per cent of its long-term exposure to developing
countries.
Tax Treatment in the UK
Introduction
The legislation relating to how LDC provisions are to
be treated for tax purposes is contained in Section 74(j)
of the Taxes Act 1988:
'No sum shall be deducted in respect of any debts,
except bad debts proved to be such, and doubtful debts
to the extent that they are respectively estimated to be
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Dec
1988
June
1989
Dec
/990
%
Barclays 38 48 70
Lloyds 34 47 72
Midland 33 50 50
Nat West 35 48 75
Table / Secondary Market Prices for Selected
LDC Sovereign Debt, 1988-1990
Mar Sept Mar Sept Mar
/988 /988 /989 1989 1990
Argentina 28 22 17 17 II
Brazil 47 47 34 30 26
Chile 57 60 59 64 65
Mexico 49 48 40 43 40
Philippines 51 52 41 49 49
Venezuela 53 49 34 41 39
Average for
these six
countries.
weighted b
end 1987
external debt 46 45 35 36 33
bad, and in the case of the bankruptcy or insolvency of
a debtor the amount which may reasonably be
expected to be received on any such debt shall be
deemed to be the value thereof.'
The relevant test for LDC risk debt is in italics.
There is limited decided case law.
In Absalom y Talbot 26 TC 166,
Lord Atkin defined 'respectively estimated' as
requiring each debt to be separately valued.
In Anderton & Halstead Ltd y Birrell 16 TC 200,
Rowiatt J. decided 'What the statute requires. . . is
an estimate to what extent a debt is bad. . . Such an
estimate is not a prophecy to be judged as to its
truth by after events but a valuation of an asset
upon an uncertain future to be judged as to its
soundness as an estimate upon the then facts and
probabilities'.
In Dinshaw y Bombay Commissioner of Income Tax
13 ATC 284, it was stated that,
Continued trading by a debtor does not of itself
prohibit bad debt relief.
Development of the Revenue Position
The Revenue starts from the position that:
sovereign risk debt cannot be bad (i.e. countries
do not go 'bust');
secondary market prices are irrelevant in
determining provision levels.
The Revenue's Statement of Practice ('SOP') dated
25 January 1983 admits bad debts relief in principle.
However, it does not preclude the Revenue from going
back to their starting position.
Prior to the introduction of the Bank of England ('the
Bank') matrix agreements for bad debt provisions
were often based on generally accepted percentages.
In 1987 the Revenue indicated that the introduction of
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the Bank's matrix would be helpful in agreeing
allowable provisions. However, the matrix was
regarded by the Revenue as having a prudential
element which would give rise to the disallowance of
part of any provision. In subsequent discussions
during 1988 it became clear that the Revenue were
looking for a close correlation between the read across
and allowable provisions.
By the beginning of 1989 the Revenue had made an
offer which had to be accepted by the seven leading
UK banks but which could be extended to other
banks. There were three options, all of which involved
an agreement of matrix scores to give an agreed read
across:
1987 provisions would be agreed at the lower of
the direct read across or the provisions made. A
similar basis would be used for 1988 and
subsequently; or
Discussions on 1987 allowable provisions would
be deferred pending discussions on 1988. This
might involve some smoothing between the two
years; or
1987 and 1988 would be agreed on the basis of the
1987 read across or the actual provisions if lower.
In the event provisions for Brazil caused a problem
with banks because the matrix produced a lower score
in 1988 than 1987. However, under pressure from
auditors and the Bank of England, banks maintained
provisions for Brazil at the 1987 levels. This
apparently led to the Revenue offering a refinement of
the direct read across basis. The treatment of Brazil
would depend on the 1989 matrix score. If the 1989
score exceeds that of 1988 both 1988 and 1989 will be
based on the 1989 score or the actual provision if
lower. If the 1989 score is equal or less than the 1988
score then the allowable provision for each period
would reflect the score for the period or the actual
provision if lower.
Further developments are awaited in the light of the
provisioning policy for 1989.
